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FIRST AMENDMENT-CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM-THE
SUPREME COURT HALTS THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S INVALIDATION OF STATE
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
Political Action Committee, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
Ifyou don't have a million bucks, you might as well forget about
running for political office these days.'
1. INTRODUCTION
"Campaign finance reform" is a term that some American politi-
cians trot out quite freely at the turn of the twentieth century. Beneath
the highly visible political veneer of the term, however, lies a difficult
legal struggle. This struggle essentially pits the integrity of the
American democratic process, in which optimally all citizens know their
votes and concerns are meaningful, against the free speech right of
citizens to engage in that process through money donations to candi-
dates. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PoliticalAction Committee,2
the United States Supreme Court addressed this struggle again, twenty-
four years after its landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo The Court in
Nixon reaffirmed its decision in Buckley, re-striking the delicate balance
that the Buckley decision created and allaying doubts, at least for now,
about Buckley's continuing vitality in the changing Court."
The story that gave rise to the carefully crafted Nixon litigation
opens this note. In this story, a would-be Missouri politician and a local
political action committee planned a lawsuit in advance of a failed
campaign, and then followed that suit through wins and losses to the
United States Supreme Court. Next, the note looks at the history of
governmental regulation of campaign financing in America, focusing on
judicial review of that regulation. The note examines Buckley as well as
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's sometimes
stringent approach to campaign finance measures. The note then delves
into the Court's reasoning in the Nixon case, in which the Court curbed
the Eighth Circuit's tendency toward invalidating state campaign
1. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971, S. REP.
No. 92-96, at 13 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1785. The Senate report
recounted this comment of an anonymous American in response to a Gallup Poll
conducted in November 1970. See id. The Gallup Poll found that 80% of Americans
favored a cap on the amount of money a candidate could spend during one election.
See id.
2. 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
4. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 901.
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finance reform measures. The final portion of the note briefly examines
the significance of the Nixon decision, closing with a call to renew
efforts to establish meaningful campaign contribution limits within the
Eighth Circuit states and especially within Arkansas.
II. FACTS
In the early and middle 1990s, there was a movement toward
campaign finance reform in Missouri.5 Some Missouri voters believed
that that the state's elected officials were bought and sold by generous
campaign contributions, rendering citizens' votes-and
concerns-worthless.6  In response to this belief,7 the Missouri
5. See Carver v. Nixon, 882 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo. 1995). In 1994, a
group of Missouri citizens, acting with the grassroots community group Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now (commonly called ACORN), sponsored a
campaign finance reform ballot initiative known as Proposition A. See Editorial, Four
Proposals on the Missouri Ballot, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1994, at 6B. The
measure passed with a majority of the citizens of Missouri voting in favor of it: "[A]n
overwhelming 74% of the voters of Missouri determined that contribution limits are
necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof." Carver v. Nixon, 882 F.
Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo. 1995), quoted in Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 908. However, the
contribution limits established in Proposition A were invalidated by the Eighth Circuit
in Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), in which the court held that the limits
were too low to be constitutional in light of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam).
6. See, e.g., Editorial, Money + Politics = Corruption, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Mar. 30, 1992, at 2B ("Money corrupts politics and politicians.... Missouri has a weak
campaign reporting law. The state does nothing to limit campaign contributions or
spending .... "); Anthony D. Ribaudo, Editorial, Campaign Funds Should Not Equal
Speech, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 6, 1992, at 3B ("Many elected officials have lost
the moral authority to govern because of the helplessness of the voters to compete with
monied interests.... The current political process, which entwines monied interests
with government decision-makers, is so morally bankrupt it requires regulation and
restraint."); Editorial, Governor for Sale, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 2, 1992, at 2C
("[Donations to the candidates for governor of Missouri] were made for one reason:
to buy influence with the person who wins the governor's chair in the Nov. 3 general
election."); Editorial, On Missouri's Agenda, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 3, 1993, at
2E ("Missouri is a wide-open state when it comes to campaign finance, so getting past
well-heeled lobbyists with [campaign finance reform measures] will be hard.... The
simple fact is that money distorts the political process, and big money makes for
twisted laws and obligated officeholders."); Editorial, Campaign Reform Still Needed, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 19, 1993, at 2B ("Nothing else Congress does this year can
do so much to rebuild public trust in government as restoring fairness to campaigns -
as well as restricting the corrupting influence of money."); Editorial, Four Proposals on
the Missouri Ballot, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1994, at 6B ("Proposition A [a
1994 campaign finance reform ballot initiative] would make further improvements to
control influence-buying in elections that lawmakers were not willing to impose on
themselves."); Editorial, New Politics Wins a Round, ST. LOuiS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 23,
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legislature imposed upon candidates for political office a regulated
system of financing their campaigns! One component of Missouri's
campaign finance reform statute" capped the amount of money that an
individual or group contributor could give to any single candidate
during one election.'0
In 1997, several years after the passage of Missouri's campaign
finance reform measure, a Missourian named Zev David Fredman
1995, at 2B ("Prop[osition] A's tough [contribution] limits represen[t] a 'positive step
towards the elimination of political corruption."') (quoting Carver v. Nixon, 882 F.
Supp. 901,906 (W.D. Mo. 1995)); see also infra note 148 (discussing other indications
of voter discontentment).
7. See Brief for Petitioners at 35, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action
Comm., 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000) (No. 98-963). Missouri does not collect legislative
history; therefore, the State of Missouri argued that the affidavit of a legislator who is
familiar with a bill's passage could operate to "fil[I] the void" created by the lack of
legislative history. See id.; but see Brief for Respondents at 37-39, Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't Political Action Comm., 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000) (No. 98-963). Missouri, in
defending its campaign finance statute, used the affidavit of the statute's sponsor,
Senator Wayne Goode, to explain its origin and purposes. See Brief for Petitioners at
35, app. at 46-47, Nixon (No. 98-963). Senator Goode was co-chair of the committee
that debated the bill and eventually advocated its passage to the legislature. See id. app.
at 46-47. In his affidavit, he stated that the bill was drafted and debated with the goal
of balancing the need for money to mount an effective campaign against the need to
reduce corruption or the appearance ofcorruption in Missouri's government. See id. See
also infra note 148 (discussing the validity of Missouri's evidentiary argument).
8. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032 (West Supp. 2000). The measure passed with
broad bipartisan support. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Nixon (No. 98-963). The
measure was passed in 1994, and took effect on January 1, 1995. See Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 130.032 (West Supp. 2000).
. 9. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032 (West Supp. 2000). The statute also included
a suggested ceiling on the total amount of money a candidate could spend on a
campaign and measures to encourage a candidate to accept the ceiling, as well as a ban
on any donations to state legislators during regular legislative sessions. See Shrink Mo.
Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Maupin, 922 F.
Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1996). These measures were invalidated as an unconstitutional
burden on free speech. See Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Maupin, 71
F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Shrink Mo. Gov't
Political Action Comm. v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
10. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032.1 (West Supp. 2000). This statute placed per-
election limits (with primaries and general elections counted as separate elections) on
contributions for any individual or group donor. The limits were: $250 for candidates
for the office of state representative or any other state office with an electorate of fewer
than 100,000; $500 for candidates for the office of state senator or any other state office
with an electorate of 100,000 or more but fewer than 250,000; and $1,000 to candidates
for statewide office (including governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state
treasurer, state auditor, and attorney general), or any other state office with an
electorate of 250,000 or more. See id.
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decided to run for state auditor." Fredman saw a rare opportunity to
gain this statewide office in the November 1998 elections, because the
incumbent Missouri state auditor decided not to seek another term of
office.'2 In the wake of the incumbent's announcement, he prepared to
mount a campaign. 3
Fredman faced several hurdles to gaining office. He had minimal
name recognition, having never run for office before.'4 He did not have
a large network of campaign contributors. 5 He did not have the support
of the Missouri Republican Party establishment. 6 Additionally,
Missouri's campaign finance law prevented Fredman from receiving
more than $1,075 from any one contributor. 7 This contribution cap
meant that Fredman had to rely on an array of smaller contributors
rather than just a generous few.'8
Fredman believed that he had just such a potential generous donor
in Shrink Missouri Government Political Action Committee ("Shrink
PAC").'9 Indeed, Shrink PAC donated $1,075 to Fredman's campaign."
Shrink PAC, in turn, asserted that Fredman was the only candidate in
the race for auditor who supported the committee's political views.2'
Fredman contended that without the ability to legally accept large
11. See Brief for Respondents app. at 12, Nixon (No. 98-963). According to a
Shrink Missouri Government Political Action Committee ("Shrink PAC") affidavit,
Shrink PAC approached Fredman with the idea that he run for the office of state
auditor. See id. app. at 38,42. Before Fredman filed for candidacy, members of Shrink
PAC and Fredman discussed the potential of their filing a lawsuit challenging
Missouri's campaign finance scheme on First Amendment grounds. See id. app. at 38,
43.
12. See Brief for Respondents app. at 12, Nixon (No. 98-963).
13. See id.
14. See id. at 6.
15. See id.
16. See id. app. at 44. The Missouri Republican Party appeared to endorse a
different candidate, Charles Pierce, for the position of state auditor. See id. app. at 12-
13,43-44.
17. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032.1 (West Supp. 2000). The statute originally
imposed a limit of $ 1,000 on contributions to candidates running for statewide offices,
including state auditor. See id. Subsequent amendment of the statute in 1997 mandated
that the limits be adjusted for inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index,
which placed the limit on Fredman's receipts at $1,075 per donor, rather than $1,000.
See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032.2 (West Supp. 2000).
18. See Brief for Respondents app. at 59, Nixon (No. 98-963).
19. See id. at 4-5.
20. See Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734,
737 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
21. See Brief for Respondents app. at 17, Nixon (No. 98-963).
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donations from a few contributors, he was effectively foreclosed from
any meaningful chance at a successful campaign for state auditor."
For these reasons, Fredman and Shrink PAC filed a federal lawsuit
seeking to invalidate Missouri's contribution limits as an unconstitu-
tional burden on political speech.23 They initially sought an injunction
preventing the Missouri Attorney General from enforcing the contribu-
tion limits."' After the district court denied the injunction, the plaintiffs
("Fredman and Shrink PAC") and defendant ("Missouri") filed cross
motions for summary judgment in the district court.' The court granted
Missouri's motion, holding that Missouri's campaign finance reform
statute did not impermissibly harm Fredman and Shrink PAC's First
Amendment interests under the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v.
Valeo.26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed
the district court's denial of the requested injunction, granting the
injunction that Fredman and Shrink PAC had initially sought." This
injunction, issued twelve days before the Republican primary, gave
Fredman a short time to garner the large contributions he sought."
Fredman was unsuccessful in the primary, receiving only 19.49% of the
votes cast.29
Fredman was more successful in the Eighth Circuit than he was in
the Republican primary. In a decision on the merits of Fredman's case,
a divided panel reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.3" The Eighth Circuit held that when Buckley's approved
contribution limits were interpreted in light of inflation, the Missouri
limits amounted to only $378 compared to Buckley's limit of $1,000."
The Eighth Circuit held Missouri's contribution caps to be impermissi-
22. See Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 737.
23. See id. at 736-37.
24. See id. at 735.
25. See id. at 742.
26. See id. at 741-42; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
27. See Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 151 F.3d 763 (8th
Cir. 1998).
28. See Brief for Respondents at 8-9, Nixon (No. 98-963).
29. See id. at 10.
30. See Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th
Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
. 31. See id. at 523 n.4; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
The Eighth Circuit panel was divided, with Judge Ross concurring and Judge Gibson
dissenting from Chief Judge Bowman's opinion.
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ble under the First Amendment.2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide the matter.33
Ill. BACKGROUND
America has only recently had a regulated system of campaign
financing. Not until the 1970s did Congress first attempt broad
regulation of the federal campaign financing system with the passage of
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA").34 A bipartisan coalition
of politicians, a potential contributor, political parties, and non-profit
organizations filed a federal lawsuit which challenged the wide-ranging
statute.35 In Buckley v. Valeo,36 the Court upheld some provisions of the
statute while striking down others.3" Since this landmark decision,
courts have decided two distinct strands of campaign finance
cases-contribution cases and expenditure cases-based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Buckley.38 This section will discuss the
state of campaign finance law before Buckley, as well as Buckley and its
progeny. This section does not discuss every campaign finance case
subsequent to Buckley; however, it discusses at length the Eighth
Circuit's approach to campaign finance measures.
32. See Adams, 161 F.3d at 523.
33. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999);
see also infra Part IV.
34. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994)).
35. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8; see also DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON,
THE MONEY CHASE: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 15 (1990). The
plaintiffs included New York Senator James Buckley, presidential candidate Eugene
McCarthy, major Democratic contributor Stewart Mott, the Republican Parties of
Mississippi and New York, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the Conservative
Victory Fund, Human Events, Inc., the Libertarian Party, and the American
Conservative Union. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8.
36. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
37. See id.
38. Compare. e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990), with Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 120 S. Ct.
897 (2000), and Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998). For information on the
contribution/expenditure distinction, see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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A. Campaign Finance Regulation Before Buckley
Prior to Congress's passage of the 1971 FECA, a9 campaign
financing was generally unregulated.4' During the aftermath of the Civil
War, Congress passed a measure that outlawed illegal voting, coercion,
manipulation of voter registration, and other election corruption. 4' It
was not until 1907, however, that Congress passed legislation that dealt
with corruption stemming from the financing ofcampaigns.42 That year,
Congress passed the Tillman Act, which prohibited campaign contribu-
tions from banks and corporations.43 In 1925, the Corrupt Practices Act
was enacted." This statute required disclosure of campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures made in the course of a campaign.45 The Corrupt
39. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994).
40. See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 35, at 13-14; ROBERT E. MUTcH,
CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND THE COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAW 24-26 (1988); FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES
1-28 (1992).
41. See Enforcement Act, 16 Stat. 44 (1870); see also SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE,
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACTOF 1971, S. REP. No. 92-229, at 20 (1971), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1840. This statute, known as the Enforcement Act, was
passed just two months after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. See STATUTORY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 443 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970). The
Supreme Court described the broad Enforcement Act as Congress's response to the
"swift and violent" reaction of white southerners to African-Americans' new political
power in the late 1860s. See id. (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803-04
(1966)).
42. See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACTOF 1971, S.
REP. No. 92-229, at 20 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1840.
43. See Tillman Act, 34 Stat. 814 (1907); see also SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE,
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACTOF 197 1, S. REP. NO. 92-229, at 21 (1971), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1841.
44. See Corrupt Practices Act, 44 Stat. 15 (1925); see also SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE, FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACTOF 1971, S. REP. No. 92-229, at 21(1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1841; MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 35, at 13
(1990).
45. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF
1971, S. REP. No. 92-229, at 21 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1841.
The Corrupt Practices Act was an ineffective deterrent to corruption, however, because
it was riddled with exceptions that exempted most contributions and expenditures from
its disclosure requirements. See MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 35, at 13 (1990).
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Practices Act withstood judicial scrutiny' and was the central federal
law regulating campaigns until the passage of the FECA.47
The 1971 FECA was the first federal law that attempted compre-
hensive regulation of federal campaign financing.4 8 The measure as
passed in 1971 focused primarily on thorough disclosure as a deterrent
to questionable campaign financing practices.49 However, the Watergate
scandal that ended President Richard Nixon's administration revealed
impropriety in the financing of his 1972 bid for re-election."0 These
revelations prompted Congress to amend the FECA in 1974.11
The 1974 amendments shifted the focus of the FECA from
disclosure to limitation. Among other things, the 1974 FECA limited
campaign contributions, contributions to political committees, and
46. Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). The Court stated,
in upholding the Corrupt Practices Act,
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to
safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influence the
result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self-
protection. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power, as it possesses
every other power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of
the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened
by force or by corruption.
Id. at 545.
47. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF
1971, S. REP. NO. 92-229, at 21 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773, 1841.
48. See generally MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 35, at 13-14; MUTCH, supra note
40, at 24-26; FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 1-28
(1992).
49. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF
1974, S. REP.No. 93-689, at 2(1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5588 ("The
Act of 1971 was predicated on the principle of public disclosure, that timely and
complete disclosure ... would result in the exercise of prudence by candidates and
their committees and that excessive expenditures would incur the displeasure of the
electorate who would or could demonstrate indignation at the polls.").
50. See FRANK J. SORAuF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONs 36-37 (1987); Marlene
Arnold Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 WIs. L. REv. 323, 323 (1977)); David Schultz,
Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign
Finance Reform Laws, 18 REv. Lmuo. 85, 91 (1999) (citing HERBERT E. ALEXANDER,
FINANCING POLrICs: MONEY, ELECnONs, & POLITICAL REFORM 32-38 (1992)).
51. See SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF
1974, S. REP. NO. 93-689, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5588. The
Senate Report stated:
It was unfortunate that the [ 1971 FECA] did not become effective until April
7, 1972, because the scramble to raise political funds prior to that date, and
thus to avoid the disclosure provisions ofthe law, resulted in broad and grave
dissatisfaction with the Act and led to a demand for new and more
comprehensive controls.
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independent expenditures in support of a candidate. 2 A constitutional
challenge to this unprecedented regulation of elections was quick to
follow." A coalition of politicians and their supporters mounted a
challenge to the various provisions of the FECA.54 Led by New York
Senator James Buckley, the opponents of the FECA filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia."
B. Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court Draws a Line Between
Contributions and Expenditures
Senator Buckley's vigorous efforts to overturn the FECA led his
case to the United States Supreme Court. In Buckley v. Valeo, 6 the Court
examined many of the provisions of the FECA.5 This note will discuss
only the portion of the Buckley opinion which upheld campaign
contribution limits and distinguished contribution limits from limits on
independent expenditures-the portion of the opinion which drew the
line that has divided the caselaw since Buckley.
The Buckley Court, in drawing this line, noted that two of the
provisions of the FECA dealt to some extent with protected political
speech: first, political contributions which an individual makes directly
to a candidate or that candidate's campaign organization;-" and second,
expenditures that an individual makes in support of a candidate, but
52. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994)). The FECA also
provided for matching funds for candidates who were willing to accept an overall
expenditure ceiling and other measures that are beyond the scope of this note. See id.
53. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994); Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C.
1975). The bill was signed into law October 15, 1974, and the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia made its initial ruling on January 24, 1975. See 2
U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994); Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1975). Senator
Buckley proposed an amendment to the 1974 bill amending the FECA which provided
for an expedited judicial review of the statute. See Buckley, 387 F. Supp. at 139-40.
Senator Buckley's amendment was passed as part of the 1974 FECA with only minor
modifications. See id. Commenting on his amendment to the FECA, Senator Buckley
stated: "[l1t is in the interest of everyone to have the question [of the FECA's
constitutionality] determined by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time." Id.
at 139.
54. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8.
55. See Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1975).
56. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
57. See id. at 8-10. The lengthy opinion dealt with the key provisions of the 1974
FECA, including tax code issues, expenditure ceilings, enforcement provisions, and
several other issues. See id.
58. See id. at 19-38 (discussing the various forms of campaign contributions and
upholding the portions of the FECA that limit such contributions).
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independently of the candidate or that candidate's campaign organiza-
tion. 9 The Court also noted the government's legitimate interest in
protecting the integrity of the democratic process from corruption, and
that corruption and perceptions of corruption are implicated to some
extent in political donations and expenditures.' With these two general
principles as guidance, the Court drew a fundamental distinction
between contributions and expenditures.6'
The Court examined both contribution limits and expenditure limits
with regard to the government's interest in preventing corruption.62 The
Court noted that where an individual contributes money directly to a
campaign, there is a greater chance of a political quid pro quo from the
candidate to the donor.63 When an individual spends money independ-
ently of the candidate, however, there is not so great a danger of
corruption because the expenditure is not coordinated with the candi-
date's campaign organization.' The Court noted that such expenditures,
59. See id. at 19-20, 39-60 (discussing the various forms of independent
expenditures and invalidating portions of the FECA that limit such expenditures).
60. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29.
61. See id.at 35,51.
62. See id. at 25-27, 44-47.
63. See id. at 45-46. The Court singled out the greatest danger of corruption or the
perception thereof: when an individual makes a contribution directly to a candidate or
that candidate's campaign organization. See id. The Supreme Court has characterized
this direct flow of money to a candidate as a "single narrow exception to the rule that
limits on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment." Citizens Against
Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,296-97 (1981), quoted in Russell v. Burnis, 146
F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir. 1998). In Citizens Against Rent Control, the Court struck down
a campaign finance measure that limited contributions to political committees that
supported ballot initiatives. See Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 300. The
Court noted that there was clearly no danger of an improper quid pro quo from a ballot
initiative, and therefore the government had an insufficient interest in limiting such
contributions. See id. at 297-99; see also Harwin v. Goleta Water Dist., 953 F.2d 488
(9th Cir. 1991) (invalidating a limit on contributions to a candidate for a local water
district in light of no evidence of any possibility of a quid pro quo from the candidate
due to a recusal provision in the campaign finance ordinance); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. City of Berkeley, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (invalidating a provision
similar to that in Citizens Against Rent Controlwhich applied to unions' and corporations'
contributions to committees supporting ballot initiatives).
64. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-46. The Court stated that independent expenditures
do "not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to
those identified with large campaign contributions." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46. However,
since the Buckley decision, independent expenditures have increased and now play a
much larger role in campaign financing. See Schultz, supra note 50, at 113 (arguing that
by compiling a sufficient evidentiary record of corruption or the appearance thereof,
a limit on independent expenditures can be sustained given the increase in independent
expenditures and their utility to candidates).
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when made independently of the campaign structure, may either hurt or
help the candidate.65
Likewise, the Court examined the differences in the speech rights
affected by the FECA's contribution limits and expenditure limits."'
The Court emphasized that when an individual contributes to a
candidate, the contributor expresses only general support for the
candidate' 7 -the contributor does not decide how or on which issue the
contribution is spent, and it is up to the campaign organization to speak
through the contribution.68 On the other hand, when the individual
independently spends his or her money in support of a candidate, the
individual decides the content of the message in support, and the
individual decides what issues are important. 69 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the FECA's contribution limits were a lighter burden on
the individual's speech rights than were FECA's expenditure limits.7"
As a result of these distinctions, the Court upheld the FECA's limit
on individual contributions directly to either a candidate or a candidate's
campaign organization.7 However, the Court invalidated those portions
65. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. This argument has been recently resurrected by
Texas Governor George W. Bush's campaign organization in his 2000 bid for the
presidency. See Wyly Profile (National Public Radio, March 9, 2000), archived in
National Public Radio, All Things Considered Archives (visited March 15, 2000)
<http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnpd01 fm.cfm?PrgDate=3%2F9%2F2000&PrgID=2>.
During the presidential primary campaign, Texas billionaire Sam Wyly made a large
independent expenditure on televisions advertisements that ran in the key battleground
states of Ohio, California, and New York. See id The ads touted the Texas governor's
environmental record. See id. They also criticized the environmental record of Bush's
then-rival for the Republican presidential nomination, Senator John McCain. See id.
Responding to questions about the ads, Bush spokesperson Karen Hughes stated: "
think the ads probably hurt us, because they brought attention on our opponent's issue
of campaign finance reform, and they were widely condemned by newspapers across
America." Id.
66. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20.
67. See id. at 21.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 46-51. The Court emphasized that the FECA's expenditure
provisions would make it a federal crime to take out a one-quarter page advertisement
in a major metropolitan newspaper in support of an identified candidate. See id. at 40.
Likewise, the Senate Report on the FECA described a scenario in which an individual
could purchase billboards in support of a candidate. See id. at 46 n.53 (citing SENATE
COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 93-
689, at 18 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5604). However, if the
billboards clearly identified a particular candidate, then the individual could spend no
more than $1,000 on the billboards, or else the individual would be violating the FECA.
See id. at 47 n.53.
70. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 29-30, 47-48.
71. See id. at 35.
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of the FECA that limited an individual's ability to make expenditures
independently of a candidate or a candidate's campaign organization."2
This distinction has been further developed by the Court in subsequent
cases.73 The issues in these cases fall into two different categories,
depending on whether they deal with a contribution limit or an
independent expenditure limit. The next section traces these two strands
of caselaw.
C. Judicial Review of Campaign Financing Regulation After
Buckley
The Supreme Court's contribution/expenditure distinction has been
the ordering principle in campaign finance cases since Buckley. With
few exceptions, the cases that involved expenditure limits have been
decided in favor of the challenger plaintiff.74 The cases that involved
contribution limits have been decided in favor of the government
defendant more often than have the expenditure cases.75 This section
will examine the expenditure cases first, and the contribution cases
second.
1. Expenditure Cases: Free Speech Priciples Override Concerns
About the Democratic Process
When considering expenditure limits, courts have almost uniformly
held that the limits violate the First Amendment as interpreted by
Buckley. The types of entities allowed to make independent expendi-
tures have broadened considerably since Buckley. In Federal Election
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee,76 the
72. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51. See also Schultz, supra note 50, at 117 n. 172 (citing
PHMIP M. STERN, STLL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BuY 197 (1992) (identifying
independent expenditures as one of the various loopholes in the FECA that the Buckley
ruling created)).
73. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 120 S. Ct. 897
(2000); Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604 (1996); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990);
Russell v. Burnis, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998).
74. See Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 618.
75. Compare, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985), andColorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), with Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
Political Action Comm., 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000). See also Colorado Republican, 518 U.S.
at 609-10 (noting the divergent rulings on the two issues).
76. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
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Supreme Court decided that political committees may make independent
expenditures in support of a candidate." Likewise, in Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission,"
the Court held that state political parties may make expenditures that are
not coordinated with a candidate's campaign structure.79 Colorado
Republican did not address whether national political parties may make
such independent expenditures."
Since Buckley, courts have been generally reluctant to allow even an
incidental infringement on an entity's ability to make an independent
expenditure in support of a candidate. In Day v. Holahan,"' the Eighth
Circuit invalidated provisions of Minnesota's campaign finance law that
provided for public matching funds for candidates against whom
independent expenditures were made."2 The Eighth Circuit held that
such matching funds would be a disincentive to independent expendi-
tures because the expenditure would put public money in the coffers of
a favored candidate's opponent. 3 Day illustrates that even an incidental
limitation on expenditures violates the First Amendment under the
principles established in Buckley."
The notable exception to the courts' almost universal invalidation
of measures that limit independent expenditures is Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce."3 In Austin, the Supreme Court found that the
Michigan government had a compelling interest in limiting the
expenditures of corporations in that state.' The state's interest in Austin
was based on its unique corporate structuring that allowed massive
wealth buildup by corporations. 7 Absent some sort of uniquely
77. See id. at 498-500.
78. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
79. See id.
80. See Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 611-12. See also Note, Soft Money: The
Current Rules and the Case for Reform, I I HARV. L. REv. 1323, 1330 & n.53 (1998)
(noting that whether the Republican National Committee or the Democratic National
Committee can legally make independent expenditures in support of a candidate is an
important and as yet unanswered question).
81. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995).
82. See Day, 34 F.3d at 1358.
83. See id. at 1359-60.
84. See id at 1360. For other examples of cases invalidating direct or incidental
expenditure limits, see Kruse v. Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998), and Republican
Party of Minnesota v. Pauly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (D. Minn. 1999).
85. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). See also Schultz, supra note 50, at 101.
86. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
87. See id. In an earlier case, the Court noted likewise that "the special
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation."
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10
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compelling interest as was present in Austin, however, it seems clear that
independent expenditures are highly protected by the First Amendment
as interpreted by Buckley.
2. Contribution Cases: Concerns About the Democratic Process
Override Free Speech Principles
In contrast to the courts' treatment of measures limiting independ-
ent expenditures, the courts have been less quick to invalidate measures
limiting contribution limits. In a decision five years after Buckley, the
Supreme Court upheld a limit on contributions imposed by the FECA."8
In California MedicalAss 'n v. Federal Election Commission,"9 the plaintiff
argued that, because its money was first donated to a political action
committee and then to a candidate, its money was spent as an expendi-
ture and not a contribution." However, the Court rejected the argument,
noting that the individual members of the plaintiff organization were
free under Buckley to make their own independent expenditures.9 In
California Medical, the Court demonstrated a willingness to look below
the surface of an argument it characterized as superficially appealing in
order to uphold limits on contributions to a candidate.'
The various United States Courts of Appeals have come to differing
results in their treatment of contribution limits. The Sixth Circuit
recently upheld a Kentucky statute that prohibited gubernatorial
candidates from accepting contributions in the twenty-eight days
preceding an election.93 In Gable v. Patton,9' the court recognized that
the Kentucky government had an interest in preventing corruption that
was analogous to the government's interest in Buckley.95 However, the
Sixth Circuit expressed reservation about whether the First Amendment
interests implicated were likewise analogous, because the statute
prohibited candidates from accepting contributions rather than prohibit-
ing individuals from making contributions." The court extended the
(1982).
88. See California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 193-99
(1981).
89. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
90. See id. at 195.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1177
(1999).
94. 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999).




Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley to allow such limitations on a
candidate's ability to accept contributions.97
The Fourth Circuit has recently emphasized the tailoring require-
ment imposed by Buckley. In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett,"
the Fourth Circuit upheld a North Carolina statute that prohibited
lobbyists and political committees from contributing to state legislators
during the regular legislative sessions." The court, however, struck
down a broader provision of the statute that barred contributions from
corporations altogether because it was not closely drawn. " The Fourth
Circuit noted that the North Carolina statute failed to distinguish
between different types of corporations with differing abilities to amass
"war chests," such as for-profit versus non-profit corporations.' '
The Eighth Circuit has been notably quick to invalidate contribu-
tion limits. In a trilogy of cases in the 1990s, the Eighth Circuit
invalidated contribution limitation measures. First, in Day v. Holahan,"°2
the Eighth Circuit invalidated a Minnesota campaign finance provision
that limited contributions to political committees to $100.03 Viewing
the limits in light of inflation, the court found that the limits were so low
that they were not narrowly tailored to serve the Minnesota govern-
ment's interest of fighting corruption."
In Carver v. Nixon,"°5 the Eighth Circuit interpreted Buckley as
mandating strict scrutiny in judicial assessments of contribution
limits." Proceeding on that assumption, the court invalidated a 1994
Missouri ballot initiative that limited contributions to a candidate for
statewide office to $300.07 As in Day, the court noted that the Missouri
measure placed limits on contributions at a considerably lower level
than did the FECA." Thus, the court ruled that the Missouri measure
was not narrowly tailored to serve the Missouri government's interest. '9
97. See id.
98. 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000).
99. See Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 714-18.
100. See id. at 714.
101. See id. at 713-14.
102. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995).
103. See Day, 34 F.3d at 1365.
104. See id.
105. 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
106. See Carver, 72 F.3d at 637.
107. See id. at 644.
108. See id. at 642 & n.8.
109. See id. at 642-44.
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Finally, in Russell v. Burris," the court reviewed an Arkansas voter
initiative that capped campaign contributions for candidates for
statewide office at $300."' Explicitly adopting the Carver standard of
strict scrutiny," 2 the court invalidated the contribution limits both as not
fulfilling a compelling state interest and as not narrowly tailored."3 The
court reviewed the evidence presented to the trial court and found no
compelling state interest in limiting corruption in Arkansas politics."'
As in Day, the Russell court noted that inflation widened the gap between
the contribution dollar amounts of the FECA and the Arkansas voter
initiative and that the Arkansas contributions were thus not narrowly
tailored.'
Shrink Missouri Government Political Action Committee v. Adams" 6 is
the Eighth Circuit's most recent application of the principles it an-
nounced in Carver, Day, and Russell. 7 Just as in those three cases, the
Eighth Circuit in Adams invalidated the Missouri contribution limits at
stake."' Unlike its refusal to review Carver, Day, and Russell, however,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nixon."9 The
Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision and rejected the
line of reasoning that the Eighth Circuit had built in Carver, Day, and
Russell. 20
IV. REASONING OF THECOURT
A. Majority Opinion: The Court Upholds Missouri's Contribution
Limits
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PoliticalAction Committee,
12
the Supreme Court clarified the power of states to limit contributions to
110. 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998).
111. See Russell, 146 F.3d at 565.
112. Seeid. at567.
113. Seeid. at571.
114. See id. at 569-70.
115. See id. at 570-71.
116. 116 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998).
117. See Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th
Cir. 1998).
118. See id
119. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
120. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 120 S. Ct. 897, 910
(2000).
121. 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000) (Souter, J., wrote the opinion for the majority of the
Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,joined).
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candidates for state political offices.'22 The Court held that, as to the
dollar amount of the limitation, state measures need not track exactly the
federal measures upheld in Buckley v. Valeo. "
In Nixon, Fredman and Shrink PAC raised both First Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to Missouri's campaign finance
statute.24 In assessing those challenges, the Supreme Court in Nixon
examined three principal issues. First, the Court rejected the use of rigid
standards of judicial scrutiny when reviewing campaign finance laws
that limit contributions to a candidate. 2 Second, the Court examined
Fredman's and Shrink PAC's claim that Missouri must show concrete
or empirical evidence of corruption or the appearance thereof in order
to save the statute.' 26 Third, the Court examined Fredman's and Shrink
PAC's claim that the Missouri contribution limits, because of inflation-
ary devaluation of the dollar, could not survive judicial scrutiny under
Buckley. 127
1. The Standard of Judicial Scrutiny to be Applied to Contribution
Limits: Whether the Government Can Show a "Sufficiently
Important Interest"
In addressing the standard of scrutiny appropriate for contribution
limits, the Court first looked to Buckley. 28 The Court noted that Buckley
rejected the intermediate scrutiny standards established in United States
v. O'Brien 29 and in the time, place, and manner cases. 30 The Court then
122. See id. at 901.
123. See id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
124. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 120 S. Ct. 897, 902
(2000). The respondents' complaint states these two general grounds for challenging
the statute. See Brief for Respondents app. at 5, Nixon (No. 98-963). The Court
assumed that the challenges are "those of free speech, association, and equal protection,
although the complaint did not so state." Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 902. The Court's
discussion of the equal protection claim was relegated to a footnote. See id. at 905 n.4.
However, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion discusses equal protection principles at
some length. See id. at 922 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 903-05.
126. See id. at 905-08.
127. See id. at 908-10.
128. See id. at 903. The Eighth Circuit stated emphatically that the Buckley Court
had established a standard of strict scrutiny. See Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action
Comm. v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 521 (8th Cir. 1998), rev 'd, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000). The
Supreme Court stated, however, that "[p]recision about the relative rigor ofthe standard
to review contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion."
Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 903.
129. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
130. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 903; Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1976) (per
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mentioned that the speech at issue in Buckley was political speech that
required the most urgent protection under the First Amendment. 3'
The Nixon Court, however, emphasized that Buckley drew a line
between caps on contributions to a candidate and independent expendi-
tures made in support of a candidate.' The Buckley Court said that caps
on campaign contributions bear more heavily on associational rights
than on speech rights, while caps on independent expenditures bear
heavily on speech rights.' Thus, the Nixon Court stated that caps on
contribution limits required a "less compelling justification" than did
caps on independent expenditures. 34
To the extent that Nixon dwelled on the appropriate standards, the
Nixon Court followed the Buckley Court's decision: When governmental
regulation "significant[ly] interfere[s]" with associational rights, the
proper standard of scrutiny requires the government to show a "suffi-
ciently important interest" in the regulation.'35 Any governmental
regulation of this right of association, the Buckley Court held, must be
"closely drawn" to fit the contours of the governmental interest, but did
curiam); see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (requiring intermediate
scrutiny of governmental regulation of conduct that communicates); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (requiring intermediate scrutiny ofgovernmental regulation
of the time, place, and manner in which speech is allowed). Under either test, the
federal contribution limits at issue in Buckley would have failed. See Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 17-18. First, according to O'Brien, a factor to be considered is whether the
government has an interest in regulating the conduct that is unrelated to the suppression
of expression. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-18. In
matters of campaign finance regulation, the government's interest is squarely focused
on preventing expression because of the negative effects of that expression. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17. Second, with regard to the time, place, and manner cases, the
Buckley Court distinguished them by noting that caps on campaign contributions have
the patent effect of limiting the quantity of speech, rather than merely the time, place,
and manner of the speech. See id. at 18; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-
58 (1965); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47-48.
131. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 903; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
132. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 904.
133. See id. at 904. Since Buckley, the Court has clarified the distinction between
the standards to be applied to abridgment of associational rights as opposed to
abridgment of speech rights in the context of independent expenditures. See Federal
Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60
(1986). The Nixon Court also addressed the relationship of a speech versus an
associational challenge to contribution caps: "[A] contribution limitation surviving a
claim of associational abridgment would survive a speech challenge as well.
Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 904.
134. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 904. The Court stated: "We have consistently held that
restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on
independent spending." Id. at 904 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986)).
135. Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
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not have to be "fine tun[ed]" as to the dollar amount of contributions. '36
The Nixon Court did not explicitly classify this standard, but the Court
contrasted it with other association cases that used strict scrutiny. 137
In applying the principles established in Buckley to the facts of
Nixon, the Court focused on two general issues: first, whether the state
must present concrete or empirical evidence of its interest in limiting
contributions; and second, whether the Missouri limits must fail under
Buckley because they are not closely drawn in light of inflation and thus
prevent candidates from mounting effective campaigns.' 3
2. Missouri Presented Concrete Evidence of Its Interest
Fredman and Shrink PAC argued that the State of Missouri did not
have a "sufficiently important interest" at stake tojustify the abridgment
of their associational rights. 39 Relying on Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission,40 they argued that
Missouri, to show its interest, was required to produce. evidence that
there was actual corruption of Missouri officials.'4 ' Likewise, Fredman
and Shrink PAC argued that Missouri was required to present evidence
of an actual perception of corruption among Missouri residents.4 2 They
asserted that Missouri had not produced any such evidence. 43
In addressing this argument, the Court first noted that Colorado
Republican was distinguishable from Nixon because it addressed the issue
of independent expenditures by political parties.'" According to the
136. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 30).
137. See id. at 904 n.3. The Nixon Court compared the Buckley standard of scrutiny
to the standards articulated in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984),
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963), and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). Roberts and Button require a "compelling" governmental
interest, rather than Buckley's "sufficiently important" interest. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at
904 n.3; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Button, 371 U.S. at 438. Likewise, Patterson required
the "closest scrutiny," which the Buckley standard did not require. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct.
at 904 n.3; Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-61. Also, the Court in Buckley labeled the
standard a "rigorous standard of review" but did not explicitly classify that standard as
strict scrutiny. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
138. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 905, 908.
139. See Brief for Respondents at 18-19, Nixon (No. 98-963).
140. 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (requiring concrete empirical evidence of corruption in
order to consider an expenditure limitation).
141. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 907; see also Brief for Respondents at 18, Nixon (No.
98-963).
142. See Brief for Respondents at 25-26, Nixon (No. 98-963).
143. See id. at 33.
144. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 907; see also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). In Colorado Republican, the
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Court, independent expenditures, because they bear more heavily on
speech rights than on associational rights, are governed by far more
rigorous First Amendment standards under Buckley.145 Therefore, the
government's burden of proving its interest in limiting expenditures was
a heavier one." The Nixon Court refused to apply the same burden to
the present case, which involved the less protected campaign contribu-
tion caps. 47
The Court nevertheless addressed Fredman's and Shrink PAC's
claim on its merits and found that Missouri had presented evidence of
an actual perception of corruption. 48  The Court next noted that
plurality opinion found that the government had not shown a risk of corruption
sufficient tojustify its limit on expenditures. See Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 616-
18. However, the opinion also expressly distinguished limits on expenditures from
limits on contributions. See id. at 615. Under the Buckley expenditure/contribution
dichotomy, the reasoning that applies to expenditure limits does not apply to
contribution caps. See id. at 615; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21. See also supra Part III(B).
145. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 907; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22, 28-29.
146. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 907.
147. See id. ("Colorado Republican thus goes hand in hand with Buckley, not toe to
toe.").
148. See id. at 907-08. The Court noted that Proposition A, the 1994 campaign
finance reform ballot initiative, passed with 74% of Missouri citizens approving of the
measure. See id. at 908. The Court also noted that the district court cited several
newspaper accounts of a perception of corruption. See id. at 907; see also Shrink Mo.
Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 n.6 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
Finally, the Court noted that Missouri offered the affidavit of state Senator Wayne
Goode who attested to a perception of corruption in Missouri politics. See Nixon, 120
S. Ct. at 907. Due to these factual allegations, the Court stated that "this case does not
present a close call." Id. at 907.
However, the Court did not address the issue that one of Missouri's three pieces
of evidence of corruption was flawed. According to precedent, the Senator's affidavit
should have been given little weight. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 582 & n.3 (1982). In Bread, the Court was presented
with a situation remarkably analogous to the one in Nixon. The plaintiffs in Bread
sought to challenge a provision of the FECA through a judicial review amendment to
the FECA sponsored by Senator James Buckley. See id. at 579. The amendment was
ambiguous as to whether the plaintiffs were included as permissible parties to bring suit
under the statute; therefore, the plaintiffs secured an affidavit from Senator Buckley
stating that the amendment was intended to include the plaintiffs. See id. Faced with
this situation in Bread, the Court stated: "We cannot give probative weight to these
affidavits, however, because '[s]uch statements represent only the personal views of
th[is] legistlato[r], since the statements were made after passage of the Act."' Id.
(quoting Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974)); see also NORMAN
J. SINGER, STATUrEs AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 48:16-:17 (6th rev. ed. 2000)
(collecting cases in which federal and state courts have refused to give probative weight
to the testimony of legislators; declaring courts' policy rationale to be the avoidance
of passing on the credibility of legislators). The Nixon Court did not state why it
considered Senator Goode's affidavit to be probative of the legislative intent of the
Missouri legislature. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 120 S.
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Fredman and Shrink PAC had offered no specific evidence to cast doubt
on that offered by Missouri. 4 9 The Court stated that if Fredman and
Shrink PAC had offered evidence to the contrary, then Missouri might
have had to make a correspondingly more extensive evidentiary
offering." The Court deferred the question of the requirement of
empirical evidence until a future case presents a scenario where the
government has not offered any such evidence.''
3. The Missouri Limits Do Not Prevent a Candidate from Mounting an
Effective Campaign
Fredman and Shrink PAC also argued that Missouri's campaign
contribution limits should be invalidated because they were not closely
drawn and were thus fundamentally different from those scrutinized in
Buckley." 2 First, they made the general assertion that the Missouri limits
were so low that they prevented candidates from mounting effective
campaigns.'" Second, they made the more specific argument that the
Missouri limits, when adjusted for inflation, were fundamentally
different from Buckley's and should be invalidated."l
The Court dismissed the first, more general argument right away.'
The Court cited Buckley's concern that contribution limits might, if too
low, prevent a candidate from mounting an effective campaign.'56
Ct. 897 (2000).
149. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 908. The Court placed importance on the fact that
Fredman and Shrink PAC offered only scholarly works that generally opposed
campaign finance reform. See id. Noting that Missouri had offered similar scholarly
works with opposite theses, the Court stated:
Given the conflict among these publications, and the absence of any reason
to think that public perception has been influenced by the studies cited by
respondents, there is little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions
will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question




152. See Brief for Respondents at 46-47, Nixon (No. 98-963). While this argument
was not the principal argument made by Fredman and Shrink PAC, the Court addressed
it at some length, possibly because it was the primary basis upon which the Eighth
Circuit decided in Fredman's favor. See id.; see also Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action
Comm. v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 522-23 (8th Cir. 1998).
153. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 908-09.
154. See id. at 909.
155. See id. at 908-09.
156. See id.; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 ("Given the important role of
contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a
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However, the Court rejected this argument by referring to statistics
provided by Missouri.""7 These statistics showed that an overwhelming
number of campaign contributions made to candidates for state auditor
before Missouri's campaign finance statute took effect were small
donations relative to the current contribution caps. 5 ' Thus, the Court
did not engage in speculation that but for the Missouri statute,
Fredman's campaign would have been inundated with large donations.'59
The Court likewise diminished the importance of Fredman's loss in the
1998 race for state auditor."w The Court declined to infer from his loss
that the entire Missouri system was one of suppressed expression and
advocacy. 6' In sum, the Court held that Missouri's contribution limits
did not prevent candidates from mounting effective campaigns. 1
62
The Court held similarly with respect to Fredman's and Shrink
PAC's inflation argument. 6 Fredman and Shrink PAC asserted that,
when Buckley's approved contribution limits were adjusted for inflation,
the Missouri limits amounted to only $378 compared to Buckley's limit
of $1,000." This difference in the dollar amount, they argued, made
the Missouri limits fundamentally different from those at issue in
Buckley. 65 In rejecting this argument, the Court stated that Buckley did
not establish a hard limit on contributions beyond which a state could
not go.1" Instead, the Nixon Court held that Buckley only required that
severe impact on political dialogue ifthe limitations prevented candidates and political
committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.").
157. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909. Missouri appended fourteen pages of statistical
data to its brief to the Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioners app. at 23-37, Nixon
(No. 98-963).
158. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909. In 1994, before Missouri's contribution caps went
into effect, 97.62% of contributors to candidates for state auditor gave $2,000 or less.
See id. Based on this data and others provided by Missouri, the district court noted that
"candidates for political office in the state are still able to amass impressive campaign
war chests." Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734,
741 (E.D. Mo. 1998), quoted in Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909.
159. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 908-09.
163. See id. at 909.
164. See Brief for Respondents at 46, Nixon (No. 98-963); see also Shrink Mo. Gov't
Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 523 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1998). Fredman
and Shrink PAC based their calculations on the Consumer Price Index. See Adams, 161
F.3d at 523 n.4.
165. See Brief for Respondents at 46, Nixon (No. 98-963); see also Nixon, 120 S. Ct.
at 909.
166. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 909 ("[Tihis assumption [that Buckley set constitutional




a court ask whether or not the limits prevent a candidate from mounting
an effective campaign. 67 The Court referred again to the statistical
evidence offered by the state of Missouri to show that candidates in
Missouri are capable of mounting effective campaigns despite the limits
on contributions."u
In concluding the opinion, the Court responded generally to the
dissenting Justices' arguments. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
would have overruled Buckley and removed any limitations on contribu-
tions to candidates.'69 The Court responded by noting that Fredman and
Shrink PAC did not request that Buckley be overturned, and thus the
Court was constrained from doing so.7
B. Concurring Opinions: Reservations About Buckley's Expendi-
ture/Contribution Dichotomy
Justice Stevens concurred in the result of the majority's reasoning
in Nixon but wholly disagreed with the majority's reasoning.17 Justice
Stevens' concurrence made but one underlying point: the entire Buckley
framework of analysis should be discarded." He based his concurrence
on the premise that campaign contributions are not speech at all, but
rather are property."' Thus, under Justice Stevens' premise, the issue
of campaign finance should be analyzed under relevant principles of
substantive due process as they apply to constitutional protections of
property. 4 An analysis of campaign finance under these substantive
167. See id.
168. See id.; see also supra note 158.
169. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 910, 916. Justice Kennedy remained somewhat open
to limitations on contributions and expenditures, and would have overruled Buckley in
order to give legislative bodies full discretion to rework the entire campaign finance
system. See id. at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justices Thomas and Scalia would
have overruled Buckley based on the proposition that the First Amendment allows no
limitation on contributions or expenditures. See id. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 909.
171. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens juxtaposed the powers of
speech and money:
Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks
on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football field. Money,
meanwhile, has the power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks.
It does not follow, however, that the First Amendment provides the same
measure of protection to the use of money to accomplish such goals as it
provides to the use of ideas to achieve the same results,
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
174. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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due process principles, Stevens implied, would give the Court much
greater latitude in limiting contributions and expenditures.'
7
Justice Breyer also wrote a concurring opinion which Justice
Ginsburg joined. 6 This concurrence functioned primarily to justify
Buckley's distinction between expenditures and contributions. 77 Justice
Breyer initially rebuked the principal dissent for failing to recognize that
there are compelling arguments on both sides of the issue of campaign
finance.178 Next, Justice Breyer rejected Justice Steven's argument by
reaffirming the fundamental premise of Buckley: that campaign
contributions enable protected political speech and are not mere
money."
The balance of Justice Breyer's concurrence explored the reasons
why using strict scrutiny is improper when reviewing campaign finance
measures. '" First, the strong presumption against constitutionality that
accompanies strict scrutiny is improper, he stated, because of the serious
constitutional interests on both sides of the issue.", Justice Breyer
wrote that the interests of the government in preserving the integrity of
the American electoral process, if realized by campaign finance
measures, would work toward increasing speech rather than stifling it."2
Second, Justice Breyer's concurrence rejected strict scrutiny
because in matters of campaign finance, deference to the political
branches of government was proper. 3 He emphasized that those
branches of government had institutional expertise in matters of
175. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Plroperty rights... are not entitled to the
same protection as the.right to say what one pleases.").
176. See id. at 910-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
177. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring). This opinion showed the
most ardent support of all the opinions for continuing the Buckley regime of limiting
contributions while allowing unlimited expenditures. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
However, even this opinion acknowledged Buckley's potential flaws and called for
limited reform of the current regime. See id. at 913-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
178. See id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer noted that campaign
finance is a "difficult constitutional problem," and implied that any blindly facile
reasoning by its proponents or opponents does the issue a disservice. See id. (Breyer,
J., concurring).
179. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
180. See id. at 911-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
181. See id. at 911-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
182. See id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer implied that the First
Amendment presupposes a vibrant, communicative, and voting public. See id. (Breyer,
J., concurring). He stated that insofar as this is not the case in America today,
campaign finance measures seek to fulfill a fundamental First Amendment goal: to
revitalize our democracy and increase the overall volume of ideas being expressed in
the context of American electoral politics. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
183. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 912 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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campaign finance.'" Therefore, Justice Breyer urged that a strong
presumption against the constitutionality of their enactments was
improper.""
In concluding, Justice Breyer's concurrence dealt with the
possibility of flaws in the system established by Buckley." He
questioned whether Buckley provides enough flexibility to allow for
changes in the way campaigns are financed.1 87 Breyer explicitly stated
that Buckley left open to legislative bodies the option to regulate soft
money, reduced-price media time, and public financing ofcampaigns.8 8
However, agreeing with Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer remained open
to overturning Buckley if it unduly limits changes to campaign finance
systems.'"
C. Dissenting Opinions; Outright Disagreement with Buckley
Kennedy's dissent initially emphasized the failures of Buckley and
criticized the majority for failing to recognize that twenty-four years
after the Buckley decision, the regime it established no longer works.I"
Justice Kennedy stated that Nixon presented a situation in which
deference to precedent should not necessarily govern the Court's
decision-making.' 9 Kennedy concluded with the seemingly contradic-
tory statement that he was both in substantial agreement with the
principal dissent, and also open to a system of campaign finance in
which both contributions and expenditures are limited." This contra-
diction, though, made Justice Kennedy's point clear: regardless of the
direction in which campaign finance policy moves in the future, it must
move away from the flawed regime established by Buckley.1
93
184. See id. at 912-13 (Breyer, J., concurring).
185. See id. at 912 (Breyer, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 913 (Breyer, J., concurring).
187. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
188. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). This dicta is timely considering the campaign
finance bills that have lingered in the halls of Congress for the last several
congressional terms. See, e.g., McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Bill, S. 26,
106th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1999); Shays-Meehan Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform
Act, H.R. 417, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999); see also Joseph Lieberman, Campaign
Finance, 49 CAmH. U. L. REv. 5, 6 (1999).
189. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 913-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
190. See id. at 914-15 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191. See id. at 914 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas wrote the most vigorous dissent, which Justice
Scalia joined.'94 Justice Thomas advocated overruling Buckley and
eliminating restrictions on contributions, just as Buckley eliminated
restrictions on expenditures. 95 Thomas's dissent primarily urged the
use of a strict standard of scrutiny when reviewing campaign finance
measures that limit contributions."9
Justice Thomas opened his discussion with a reiteration of the
importance of political speech under our Constitution.97 The opinion
cites a number of decisions in which the Court has upheld less conse-
quential speech under the First Amendment, and therefore called into
question the Nixon Court's reasoning in abridging speech that is at the
very core of First Amendment protection.'98
The next portion of the dissent was dedicated to refuting the
proposition that is the basis of Buckley: contributions to a candidate are
not themselves speech, but rather enable speech. '" To this end, Justice
Thomas noted that in our technological nation, speech of all sorts is
disseminated effectively through the expenditure of money.2" Thus, the
dissent contended that the distinction between speech and money is
insignificant, and such a fragile distinction should not have served as the
basis for Buckley's upholding of campaign contribution caps.2"'
Justice Thomas concluded his dissent with a scathing critique of
what he saw as the majority's poorly reasoned adherence to Buckley.2"
Thomas questioned what standard of review the majority used in
upholding Missouri's statute, noting that the Nixon standard does not fit
194. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 917 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) (protecting the filing of lawsuits); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (protecting the making of defamatory statements about public officials);
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (protecting the wearing of military
uniforms by civilians in theatrical productions); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975) (protecting the exhibition of drive-in movies with nudity); United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (protecting the burning of the American flag); Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion) (protecting nude
dancing).
199. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 917-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 918 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 922-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated that the
majority "blindly adoptied] Buckley's flawed reasoning without so much as pausing,"
and that the majority "hi[d] behind Buckley's discredited reasoning," among other
criticisms. Id. at 922-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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neatly within a traditional classification of strict scrutiny or intermediate
scrutiny. ' 3 Finally, the dissent attacked the evidentiary basis for the
majority opinion, arguing that Missouri did not carry its burden of
proving an important state interest in limiting contributions.' 4
The opinions in Nixon, taken in the aggregate, reveal a Court with
sharp ideological divisions. Between Justice Stevens' advocacy of
abandoning a First Amendment analysis altogether and Justice Thomas'
advocacy of abandoning all limits on campaign contributions, the
majority of the Court managed to find an analytical center in Buckley's
reasoning. Although the majority's reasons for upholding Buckley were
delicately balanced among competing interests, Nixon ensures that for
the time being, at least, Buckley remains the core of campaign finance
jurisprudence.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THENIXON DECISION
Nationally, the campaign finance reform debate is focused on such
acute problems as soft money, political action committees, and issue
advocacy. °5 However, at the state level, the issues at the fore of
campaign finance reform are often simpler, if no less politically
charged."' For example, in Nixon, Missouri's contribution limits were
hotly contested, while at the national level the constitutionality of
contribution limits is nearly taken for granted. Nixon does not address
the complex campaign finance issues that are debated at the national
level; rather, Nixon speaks to efforts at the state level to impose
contribution limits on candidates for state offices.
The Court's decision in Nixon is of immediate importance to states
in the Eighth Circuit because the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's
rigid approach to analyzing contribution limits.20" Generally, the Court
203. See id. at 922 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204. See id. at 925 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. For a discussion of how these issues impacted the 1996 national election, see
Joseph Lieberman, The Politics of Money and the Road to Self-Destruction, 16 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 425 (1998).
206. For a thorough discussion of state campaign contribution limits, see William
J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can You Go? State Campaign Contribution Limits And The First
Amendment, 76 B.U. L. REv. 483 (1996).
207. On remand from the United States Supreme Court, Judge Bowman wrote a tart
concurrence that illustrates the sharp ideological divide between those favoring and
opposing campaign contribution limits:
In Shrink Missouri, the Supreme Court has spoken in a way that subordinates
core First Amendment rights of free speech and free association to the
predilections of the legislature and the mood of the electorate. Given that
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rejected the Eighth Circuit's use of formulaic strict scrutiny in reviewing
contribution limits. Specifically, the Court took a more relaxed
approach to the state's evidentiary requirements and to the state's
tailoring of the limits. This section initially examines each of the
Court's specific criticisms of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in turn, then
discusses the state of campaign finance reform in Arkansas, and closes
with a call for re-examination of campaign finance in Arkansas.
The Court's decision in Nixon reveals that very little evidence is
required for a state to sustain a contribution limit by showing its interest
in the regulation. Nixon was initially decided on a motion for summary
judgment, and the district court cited only three pieces of indirect
evidence of a public perception of corruption in Missouri government.
The Supreme Court found this scant record to be ample evidence of the
state's interest. Thus, the Court implicitly acknowledged that a state
need not conduct extensive empirical studies of corruption or the
perception of corruption in order to prove its interest in combating such
corruption. Nixon establishes that in cases involving contribution limits,
the state's interest in preventing real or perceived corruption is nearly
presumed.
Similarly, Nixon is also significant because the Court allowed
Missouri's contribution limits a good deal of tailoring latitude. The
Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's strict tailoring requirement, which
went so far as to calculate contribution limits according to inflation
since the 1976 Buckley decision. The Court clearly established that
states do not have to take inflation since Buckley into account, and that
Buckley's $1,000 contribution limit does not represent a constitutional
template.
Following the Nixon decision, states in the Eighth Circuit may
reasonably be more hopeful that contribution limits can withstand that
court's scrutiny. In Arkansas, statewide candidates are currently subject
to a $1,000 limit on contributions.2 s Thus, Arkansas's campaign
decision and the current political climate, we no doubt can expect further,
even more draconian, efforts by government to restrict political speech. Any
state armed with the power to limit what citizens may choose to contribute
to candidates for political office, or what they otherwise may spend on
political activity, bears close watching, and the courts must remain vigilant
in performing their duty to protect the essential freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 204 F.3d 838,843 (8th Cir. 2000)
(Bowman, J., concurring).
208. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-203 (Michie Repl. 2000). The $1,000 limit on
contributions was effective after the Eighth Circuit's decision in Russell which
invalidated the lower limits imposed by a 1996 Arkansas ballot initiative. See Russell
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contribution limits are nearly equivalent to the Missouri limits litigated
in Nixon. The Nixon case, indirectly, shields the Arkansas limits from
attacks on their constitutionality. More importantly, the Nixon case
creates a more favorable climate for future work in campaign finance
reform in Arkansas. Such future work may focus on a newly-created
gray area in the law of state contribution limits: a $1,000 limit is
acceptable according to the United States Supreme Court, but a $300
limit is too low according to the Eighth Circuit. Because Nixon
implicitly halted the Eighth Circuit's stringent treatment of state
campaign finance measures, concerned citizens in Arkansas and other
states in the Eighth Circuit may now more confidently work to enact
further campaign finance reform.
Erin Buford Vinet"
v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 568-73 (8th Cir. 1998). Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-6-
203 first provided for legislatively enacted $1,000 limits for statewide offices, and the
subsequent ballot initiative lowered the limits to $300. After the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Russell which invalidated the $300 limits, it was unclear if the $1,000 limit
would again be effective, or whether there would simply be no contribution limit in
Arkansas. However, on remand from the Eighth Circuit, Judge Bill Wilson of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reinstated the original
$1,000 limits in an unpublished judgment. See Russell v. Burris, No. LR-C-97-0089
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 24, 1998). Thus, the Arkansas Ethics Commission, the administrative
entity charged with enforcing Arkansas's campaign laws, promulgated administrative
rules limiting contributions to $1,000 for candidates for statewide offices. See
ARKANSAS ETHIcs COMMISSION, RULEs ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND DISCLOSURE § 203, at
9 (amended ed., 1999).
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